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Abstract 
 
Pension systems and, as ratios of GDP, pension expenditures show large variation among countries.  
This variation reflects, above all, demographic factors and differences in the level of insurance 
protection, the latter tending to increase with the level of development.  The focus of this paper is 
pension developments and reforms in the FOUR transition countries:  the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland and Romania, during the 1990s.  In terms of key pension statistics, Poland and Romania are 
clear outliers not just among the FOUR, but also in Europe.  The greater pension expenditures in 
Hungary and, especially, Poland are in part inherited from the socialist system and in part caused by the 
more radical restructuring reforms which have been adopted since the collapse of that system in 1988-
1990.  These greater expenditures have prompted these two countries to start replacing gradually their 
PAYG-DB system with a three-pillar mixed system, in which private pension funds are intended to 
become a large, eventually the dominant, component.  This chapter gives an account of the main aims 
and principles of the reform measures which came into force in Hungary in 1998 and in Poland in 1999. 
 Also reported are estimates of the public debt implicit in the obligation of the pre-reform state 
pension system to pay benefits to current pensioners and to current workers.  These estimates are found 
to be, for Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic, significantly higher than in main European Union 
countries. 
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Pension Problems and Reforms in 
the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Romania1 
 
Stanislaw Gomulka 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
All transition countries inherited pension systems based on the principles of pay-as-you-go and defined-
benefit (PAYG-DB).  In the early years of operation, such systems had advantages over a fully-funded, 
defined-contribution (FF-DC) system.  For, under a PAYG-DB arrangement, those who retire receive 
pension benefits immediately and contributions initially tend to exceed the payments.  These advantages, 
however, disappear later on, when population (and employment) growth rates decline and when people 
live longer after retirement.  Under such circumstances, an FF-DC programme has the advantages of 
greater flexibility and transparency, hence greater financial viability.  The changeover from PAYG-DB 
systems to FF-DC systems is therefore a worldwide trend.  In transition economies, this trend was 
reinforced by a crisis of pension finances due to three additional factors (1) large transformational 
recession, (2) extension of pension insurance to farmers and (3) rapid expansion of the informal 
economy.  Factor 1 increased expenditures as early retirements became a popular way of containing the 
unemployment problem; it also reduced revenues as employment declined.  Factor 2 increased net 
expenditures since farmers’ contributions have been insignificant.  Factor 3 reduced revenues. These 
factors have therefore made this changeover more urgent and, in some countries, more rapid. 
This paper focuses on pension problems, developments and reforms in FOUR transition 
countries:  the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Romania, during the 1990s.  Its main purpose is 
threefold, to explain the large differences in these developments among the FOUR, to relate them to 
corresponding developments in some of the key European Union (EU) and OECD countries, and to 
explain the main aims and principles of the reforms. 
 
 
2. Pension Developments During Transition 
 
An earlier survey of pension systems at the beginning of transition was made by Kopits (1992).  The 
topic was revisited recently by Cangiano, Cottarelli and Cubeddu (1998).  These surveys identified a 
number of common features, or ‘stylized facts’, with respect to pension developments.  These are as 
follows: 
 
(i) Early retirement reached significant proportions in most countries, as the pension system was 
used to cushion the effect of transition on open unemployment; 
 
(ii) The system dependency ratio (the ratio between pensioners and contributors) has been rising 
rapidly, reflecting both a sharp decline in the number of contributors and a rapid growth of the 
number of pensioners.  
                                                 
1 To appear in M. Dabrowski and J. Rostowski (eds.), The Eastern Enlargement of the EU, Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, forthcoming in 2001. 
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(iii) The fall in the number of contributors reflected both a large drop in total output and a sharp 
increase in the share of the informal economy in that output. 
 
I propose to augment this list by three additional stylised facts:   
 
(iv) The cushioning use of the pension system – fact (i) - was more common in Central and Eastern 
Europe (CEE) than in the countries of the FSU.  It was also more common in countries where 
restructuring was deeper and faster. 
 
(v) In several countries, the rise in the ratio between pensioners and contributors reflected the 
extension of pension protection to farmers.  And, 
 
(vi) The relaxation of health criteria for entitlement to invalidity pensions reflected poorer work 
prospects, possibly also increased incidences of corruption among the medical profession. 
 
Despite these common features, developments in pension finances have been remarkably 
diverse.  As can be seen from Table 1, this diversity also applies to the FOUR countries which concern 
us here.  The diversity is driven mainly by two factors:  an exceptionally high number of non-retirement 
pensioners in Poland and an exceptionally low replacement rate in Romania.  The first factor is making 
Poland an outlier not only in Central and Eastern Europe, but also world-wide.  The second factor is 
making Romania similar to the countries both of the FSU and most of the OECD (Chand and Jaeger, 
1996 Table 6), but different from the main EU countries:  Germany, France and Italy, where 
replacement rates are close to those of Hungary and Poland. 
Given the weight of non-retirement pensions in Poland, it is instructive to look in greater detail at 
the composition of these pensions.  This is done in Table 2 for all categories of pensioners in several 
years and in Table 3 for several types of pensioners outside agriculture in a single year, 1996. 
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Table 1.  Major Trends in Pension Finances of the FOUR, 1990-1998 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Category   Czech Republic   Hungary    Poland    Romania 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Size of pension   Broadly constant at about 8% net  Broadly constant at about  Increased from 6.5% in 1989 Declined in 1990-1, then 
expenditures, % of GDP  of tax and about 10% if taxable  10.5%    to nearly 15% in 1995, then broadly stable 
about stable    
 
Number of pensioners:  Increasing:    Increasing:   Increasing:   Increasing: 
(a) % of population of  (a) from4 116% in 1990 to 117%  (a) from4 105% in 1990  (a) from4 128% in 1989  (a) from4 73% in 1989 
    of pensionable age  in 1998                  to 130 in 1995   to 148% in 1995   to 80% in 1995 
(b) % of contributors 
 
Average pension   Declining from 62% in 1990  Declining from 64.4% in  Increasing from 43% in 1989 Declined from about 47% in 1990 
% of wages    to 44% in 1995, then broadly               1991 to 55-58% in 1996-98 to 65% in 1995, then declining to 36% in 1998 
    stable         somewhat 
 
Contribution rate in 1996,  26     30.5    45.5    25.5(32.5 as of 1999) 
   % of wages 
 
Retirement age   62 for men since 1996 and   Progressively raised and      To be raised progressively to 62 for men and 57 for women, 
57-61 for women (depending  unified to 62 for men  65 for men and 60 for  to be raised to 65 and 62 
          on number of children) in 2007  (2001) and women (2009)  women until 2010 from  respectively 
effective ages of 59 and 55 
respectively 
 
Dependency ratios: 
(a)  old age5   About 33, stable     About 36, stable   About 33, stable    n.a. 
(b)  system6   About 60, stable    Increasing sharply from  About 60, stable    n.a. 
         53 in 1990 to 84 in 1996 
 
Size of contribution  Broadly constant at about   Declining from 11% in   Increasing from 7.8% in 1989 Declining from 6-7% in 1990-93 
revenues, % of GDP  8-9%     1991 to 8-9% in 1995-98  to 11.8% in 1995, then stable to below 5% in 1996 
 
National PAYG   Small surplus    Deteriorating from balance Deteriorating from a surplus Deteriorating from a surplus 
financial balance, % of GDP      to a deficit of 1-2%  of 1.4% in 1989 to a deficit close to 1% to a deficit close 
of 3.2% in 1995, then  to 1% during the 1990’s 
broadly stable 
 
Notes:  1) Assumes 2% rate of growth of real pensions and 3% discount rate.2) Current beneficiaries only 3) Outside agriculture 4) Pension age population refers to:  in the Czech Republic and Hungary, women  over the 
age of 55 and men over the age of 60; in Poland and Romania, all over 60; 5) 60+ years old as a percentage of 20-59 years old,  6)  Pensioners as a percentage of  contributors or employees. 
Sources:  For the Czech Republic, official data as reported by O. Schneider (1999) and IMF (1998).  For Hungary, Cangiano et.al. (1998), Augustinovics (1997), Palacios and Rocha (1997), and Nestor and Vajda (1999). For 
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Poland. Polish Government (1999), Gomulka and Jaworski (1998) and Gomulka and Styczen (1999).  For Romania, Cangiano et al, 1998) and De Menil et al, (1999). 
 
 -5- 
Table 2 
Poland:  Non-Retirement Pensions and Pensioners, 1989-99 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Category     1989  1995  1998 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
A.   Pensioners 
       I.   Non-retirement, as % of retirement 
1.  Outside agriculture  139  117  114 
2.  In agriculture     30    63    73 
3.  Total      98  100  104 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
       II.  Non-retirement, as % of population  
1.  Outside agriculture  10.4   12.2  12.8 
2.  In agriculture     5.3   10.3  10.6 
3.  Total      9.4   11.8  12.4 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
B.   Pensions expenditures 
       I.   Non-retirement, as ratio of retirement  
1.  Outside agriculture   1.2    0.8   0.9 
2.  In agriculture    0.4    0.6   0.7 
3.  Total     1.0    0.8   0.8 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
       II.  Non-retirement, as % of GDP    
1.  Outside agriculture   2.9   5.7   5.5 
2.  In agriculture    0.3   0.9   0.9 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
Note:  With respect to agriculture, the population is taken to be 20% of the total and GDP to be 5% 
of the total. 
Source: Government of Poland ‘Strategy for public finances and economic development, Poland 2000-
2010’, June 1999, Table 1. 
 
 
Table 3 
Poland:  Non-Retirement Pensions, Pensioners and Public Implicit Debt 
In 1996, Outside Agriculture 
 
Percent, 100 = retirement pension 
Type of benefit  Number of 
pensioners 
Average pension Implicit debt 
1. Men, invalidity of category    
 I 12 85 12 
 II 43 70 41 
 III 51 62 47 
2. Women, invalidity of category    
 I  9 89  8 
 II 28 74 26 
 III 30 62 26 
3. Survivors, all 84 70 58 
Source:  S. Gomulka and P. Jaworski (1998). 
 
Data in Tables 2 and 3 imply that the problem of large non-retirement pension expenditures has in 
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terms of the number of pensioners been inherited from pre-transition period, but its weight, in terms of 
expenditures in relation to GDP, has increased during transition.  Moreover, the model of pension 
payments established outside agriculture has during the 1990s been extended to the agriculture 
population, aggravating further the pressure on public finances. 
These data also show that non-retirement pensions outside agriculture were already unusually 
numerous in 1989, probably reflecting the exceptionally strong bargaining power of Polish workers for 
many years before the start of transition. The observed rapid convergence of the incidence of non-
retirement pensions in agriculture to that outside agriculture after 1989 also reflects the implementation of 
pension privileges granted to farmers before 1989.  However, Poland is the only country of the FOUR 
among all transition countries (except Slovenia), where the replacement ratio increased sharply during 
transition since 1989.  This increase took place at the start of transition, mainly in the year 1991.  The 
sharp rise of the replacement rate was unintended by the authorities, since the indexation rule used was 
based on wages.  The simultaneous increases of this rate and of the ratio of pensioners to contributors at 
the start of transition undermined public finances during the entire transition period.  As early as 1993 an 
attempt was made to reverse this upward trend of pension expenditures as a proportion of GDP, by the 
introduction of the “0.91” rule, which reduced pensions by 9%.  However, by 1993 pensioners in Poland 
constituted one third of the entire electorate.  Under their pressure, after 1994 the 0.91 rule was gradually 
phased out.  The threat of a fiscal crisis in the pension system persuaded the authorities, in 1996, to 
replace the wage indexation rule by a price indexation rule.  This change proved effective in halting the 
upward trend of the ratio of pension expenditures to GDP.  Indeed, since 1996, this ratio started to 
decline somewhat. 
The number of pensioners as a proportion of the population of pensionable age is an indicator of 
the extent of early retirement privileges and the treatment of farmers.  This proportion increased in all the 
FOUR countries, but especially sharply in Poland and Hungary.  Again, Poland and Romania are clear 
outliers. 
 
 
3. The FOUR Compared with 2nd Wave of EU Entrants 
 
The key data on pension expenditures and pension liabilities for major industrial countries are given in 
Table 4.  Both the magnitude and the inter-country variation of these data are similar just as in our FOUR 
transition countries.  Comparisons with the four countries which represented the 2nd wave of EU entrants 
may also be of interest.  These data are given in Table 5. 
 
Table 4 
Social Pension Expenditures by Type of Benefit 
(1994, in percent of GDP) 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Country  Retirement  Invalidity  Survivors  TOTAL 
        & family 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Greece       8.5   1.4   1.7   11.6 
 
Ireland       4.3   1.4   3.4     9.1 
 
Portugal  6.1   2.1   3.2   11.4 
 
 
 -7- 
Spain  7.4   1.8   2.5   11.7 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
Source: Eurostat, Social Protection Entrepreneurs and Receipts, 1980-1994, after M.V. Rostagno and 
F.Util (1998, Table 1). 
These data are similar to those for the Czech Republic and Hungary.  Poland’s spending on 
survivors’ and family pensions (1.9% of GDP in 1998) is also in line with the four EU countries.  The 
aspect which makes Poland an outlier is mainly the size of invalidity pensions (4.5% of GDP in 1998).  
Compared to the unweighted average for the four EU countries (6.6% of GDP in 1994), Poland spends 
more on retirement pensions (8.0% in 1995 and 7.7% in 1998), but the difference is relatively small and 
declining.  Romania, on the other hand, is a clear case of under-protection.  In 1998, only 46% of the 
active population were covered by the social insurance system (De Menil, et al, 1999).  Moreover, the 
replacement rate has become unusually low during transition (Table 1).  Consequently, Romania’s 
pension expenditure, at about 5.5% of GDP, is a major factor in keeping the country’s public finances 
under control. 
 
 
Table 5 
Public Pension Schemes:  Expenditures and Liabilities 
(in percent of GDP) 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
Implicit pension debt2 
___________________________ 
Country   Expenditure in 1990   Present   Present 
retirees   workforce 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
Germany1   12.3    106   115 
France1    13.3    128   136 
Italy    14.2    171   187 
Japan     5.7     68    98 
USA     6.9     32    77 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
Notes: 1) 1992, 2) Assumes a sudden transition to a fully funded system, making the estimates comparable 
to those for our FOUR countries, see Table 6 in Section 5. 
Source: S. K. Chand and A. Jaeger, 1996. 
 
A large variation in public pension expenditures can be found also among the most developed 
countries (Table 5).  It is noteworthy that these expenditures in the Czech Republic, Hungary and 
especially, Poland are comparable to the highest among these countries. 
 
 
4. Key Problems of the Pre-Reform System 
 
The radical market-oriented reforms which the FOUR and other transition countries adopted at the end 
of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s did not extend to the pension system.  Not only in the Czech 
Republic and Romania but also in Hungary (until 1998) and Poland (until 1999) the system remained fully 
state-managed, highly redistributive, and financed on a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) basis.  Social security 
contributions continued to be strictly proportional to wages and paid fully by the employer.  These 
contributions did not go into individual accounts, but into the single account of the State Pension 
Authority.  They were thus effectively a form of  tax collected for the specific purpose of financing current 
pensions.  Employees remained largely unaware both of the size of their cumulative contributions and of 
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any link between these contributions and future pensions.  The pensions themselves were calculated not 
on the basis of the cumulative contributions of individuals, but by a formula that in addition to 
contributions was taking into account several other factors as well.  For most of the 1990s this formula in 
Poland was: 
 
pi = 0.24w* + 0.013niwi + 0.007miwi + pi*  (1) 
where pi is the pension paid to an individual i at the point of retirement, w* is the national average wage, 
wi is the ith  person average wage during the last several years (from 2 to 10) of work, ni is the number of 
years of work and mi is the number of non-contributory years.2  Finally, p*i stands for the pension right on 
account of privileges for which the individual might be eligible because of the type of work he or she had 
performed. We may note in formula (1) the large size of the redistributive component, 0.24w*, which is 
augmented by the impact of privileges for some categories of workers.3  Both redistributive components 
weaken the link between current earnings and future pensions, thus reducing the incentive to work. 
Any individual i would judge the size of his or her pension in terms of the replacement ratio, pi 
/wi.  The presence of large redistributive terms in (1) implies that this ratio would be high for people for 
whom the ratio of their own wage to the average wage, wi/w*, is low.  Let ? be the replacement ratio 
such that the wage wi buys the same standard of living as the pension ?wi. The value of ? is person-
specific, but is usually taken to be in the range between 0.6 and 0.8.  Suppose ? = 0.7.  The actual 
average replacement ratio for old-age pensioners rose, in the 90s, to a level between 0.7 and 0.8 in 
Poland and a level between 0.6 and 0.7 in Hungary.  Thus for a large proportion of current employees in 
these two countries, their expected pension would have been close to or larger than 0.7 times their own 
earnings.  Such employees would have no incentive to make private savings out of their current earnings.  
The fairly radical reform policies and the rather fast economic restructuring of the 1990s rapidly 
aggravated the problem of financing the state pension system, from both the revenue side and the 
expenditure side.  The number of contributors to the social security system has declined due to increased 
unemployment and growing evasion.  On the other hand, to alleviate the social cost of transformation, 
early retirement was allowed and the criteria for granting disability pensions were liberalised.  These 
measures meant a rapid rise in the number of pensioners.  To meet the escalating pension bill, higher 
payroll taxes were imposed on the firms.  The result was a higher labour cost, which became a factor 
discouraging employment and encouraging evasion (Golinowska, et al, 1997; Golinowska and Hausner, 
1998; Palacios and Rocha, 1997). 
During the 1990s, demographic changes did not make a significant contribution to the financial 
difficulties of the pension system in Poland in the 1990s.  However, demographic projections indicate that 
such changes could become a major additional source of tension within the next 10 to 20 years (Styczen, 
1999).  In the Czech Republic and Hungary, the demographic factor has already become a source of 
financial tension. 
 
 
5. Implicit Public Debt of the Pre-Reform Pension System 
 
The PAYG-DB pension system may be viewed as a social pact involving three overlapping generations:  
                                                 
2  These include years spent in higher education, an unpaid leave for mothers of 3 years per child up to a maximum 
of  6 years, and the period when a disability pension was received. 
3 The most significant privileges were granted to miners, soldiers and police, but some privileges were also given 
to teachers, rail workers, steel workers, sailors and others. 
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those who work currently finance pensions of those who have already retired in exchange for a promise 
that their own pensions will in future be paid by the next generation of workers. 
 The reform adopted by Hungary and Poland and planned by Romania changes thisarrangement in 
a fundamental way, as social security contributions of current workers go in part to personal accounts 
(pillar I) and in part to private pension funds (pillar II).  The capital accumulated in pillar II can no longer 
be used automatically by the state to pay the pensions of people other than those who effectively own it.  
Moreover, capital accumulated in pillar I has also individual owners.  Both capitals can be used to pay 
current pensions, but the payments would represent a debt of the state. 
 Two questions may be asked.  Firstly, what would be the capital needed at the beginning of the 
reform to settle all the future pension obligations of the state with respect of those who are already 
beneficiaries?  Thus suppose that the transition to the new system is instantaneous, so that current 
contributions cannot be used at all to finance any current pensions.  As this capital is not available to the 
pension system, it would have to be borrowed to meet future obligations to current pensioners.  
Therefore, the capital is a form of public debt. Because of the terms of the social pact, this debt is not a 
part of the official public debt before the reform.  However, this debt is implicit in pension obligations and 
will become gradually explicit after the reform, in the course of gradual switching to the new system.  The 
second question concerns the current value of the pension entitlements of those who, because of their 
past social security contributions or poor health or family circumstances, have already acquired some 
pension rights by the start of the reform.  The capital represented by those rights is another form of the 
implicit public debt of the present pension system.  In Tables 1 and 3 estimates of this implicit debt are 
reported.  For the FOUR they are based on a common estimation method.   
 For the people who are already pensioners, the following approach is used.  Suppose a specific 
benefit in the initial year is Y0, and assume that its rate of growth will be constant.  The benefit is assumed 
to be defined fully by the type of pension, the age of person, and the sex of person.  It is also assumed 
that the rate of growth of benefits is common, a constant g.  The question is what should be the initial fund 
K0 that is just high enough to pay the benefits Y1, Y2,….,YT during an expected lifetime T, assuming that 
the capital still unspent at any time during this period produces a rate of return r?  Thus K0 is a solution to 
the following problem: 
 
   Kt=(1+r)Kt-1-Yt    (2) 
 
   KT=0      (3) 
 
   Yt=(1+g)Yt-1     (4) 
 
Where t=1,2…,T.  The terminal value of the capital, KT, is zero as the fund is to be spent fully by year T. 
 The solution to this problem is: 
 
 
 
The required initial capital is thus the present value of all future payments:  Y1, Y2,….,YT with the rate of 
return r being the discount rate.  In (5), both Y0 and T are specific for particular group of pensioners in 
the initial year, taken to be the first year under the new system.  For example, for old-age pensioners 
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outside agriculture in Poland there were 102 groups considered:  51 age classes – from 40 years old and 
younger to 90 years and older for each of the two sex categories.  The capital K0 was compared 
separately for each group characterised by an age class, a type of pension, and a sex category.  The 
numbers Y0 and T vary as between groups, but both were assumed to be common for all members of 
any specific group (Gomulka and Jaworski, 1998). 
 The method used to estimate the implicit pension debt with respect to those who acquired some 
pension rights by the beginning of the new system requires no new data.  It is assumed, however, that the 
age composition of all new pensioners will be the same over time as that observed initially.  This 
stationarity assumption also applies to the expected lifetime and the size of benefits of all members of each 
age group.   
 To explain the method, let us consider all the people who were in the initial year, say 1996, of age 
21, 22,…40, and who become pensioners at the age 40.  Let 
 
    V(40,20-k, 1996+k) 
 
be the present value of all the expenditures on pensions for these 40-year olds at the point of retirement.  
These people become pensioners in the year 1996+k, after working and acquiring pension rights during 
(20-k) years of work.  It is assumed that pension rights are proportional to the duration of work and 
subject to growth in real terms at a rate g.  Hence 
 
 
 
where k=1,…,20, and r is the discount rate.  Therefore the total present value of pension rights 
for those people will be 
 
 
As the value V(40,20-k, 1996) is known, we can compute (7) for any magnitude of g, selected to be 0, 
2 and 4%, and for any value of r, chosen to be equal to 3%. 
 The method presented above was used to estimate implicit public (pension) debt in all FOUR 
countries.  The estimates have been done separately for those already retired and for those still working.  
The results are as follows (Table 6): 
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Table 6 
Implicit Pension Debt 
(in percent of GDP) 
 
Country g 
in % 
Already retired 
Men                Women 
Working 
Men                Women 
Total 
 
  Old   other 
age 
Old   other 
age 
All kinds All kinds All kinds 
Czech Republic 0 
2 
4 
22       14 
25       18  29   
    23 
30       14 
36       18 
43       26 
     59 
76   
99  
59 
77 
105 
199 
251 
324 
 
Hungary2 0 
2 
4 
 
Not  
available 
 
Not available 
 
Not available 
 
No available 
293 
407 
600 
Poland3 0 
2 
4 
42      40 
50      48 
61      58 
47        38 
55      44 
66       52 
34 
42 
54 
50 
62 
78 
251 
302 
370 
 
Romania4 0 25      9 43      23 48 63 211 
 
1. 0. Schneider, CASE WP No.167, 1999. 
2. Z. Vajda, The Macroeconomic Implications of a Pension Reform, CASE, 1999. 
3. S. Gomulka and P. Jaworski, CASE, WP No. 14, extended version, 1998. 
4. G. De Menil, S. Hamayon and M. Seitan, CASE WP No.177, 1999.  
 
This debt for the category of the already retired turns out to be close to 100% of GDP in the 
Czech Republic, Hungary and Romania, but close to 200% of GDP in Poland.  Again the key reason for 
this difference is the unusually large number and size of non-retirement (invalidity and family) pensions in 
Poland.  These pensions cost about 6.5% of GDP in Poland, which is about twice the cost in Hungary, 
about 3 times the cost in the Czech Republic and about 5 times the cost in Romania. 
 
 
6. Aims and Principles of the Reforms in Hungary (1998) and Poland (1999) 
 
In both Hungary and Poland the pension reform was intended to address the key problems:  large 
expenditures and disincentives to work and savings.  These problems are in turn related to low effective 
retirement ages, liberal disability criteria, high replacement ratios, large redistribution through the pension 
formula, and privileges for some categories of workers.  There was also a need to diversify the 
institutional architecture in two ways:  by complementing compulsory contributions with voluntary ones 
and by complementing the state social security system with private pension funds.  The motivation of the 
reforms was thus both microeconomic and macroeconomic.  There were two main microeconomic 
concerns.  One was to create a far tighter link  than under the old system between pension benefits and 
pension contributions, thereby strengthening the incentive to work and the disincentive to evade.  
Addressing this concern required a drastic lowering of the redistributive component and the establishment 
of individual accounts to make the system more transparent.  The other central microeconomic concern 
was to lower the obligatory social security contributions paid by the employer, in order to reduce labour 
costs and increase employment.  The key macroeconomic aims of the reform were also two.  One was to 
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bring down, in both countries, the aggregate levels of public expenditures on pensions, as proportions of 
GDP, from the very high levels they had reached during the first phase of economic transformation.  Such 
reductions were needed to make public finances less of an obstacle to growth, by reducing the total 
taxation burden and the budget deficit, and to make it rather an instrument of growth, by increasing public 
resources for education and infrastructure investment.  The other aim was to induce the working 
population to save more on a voluntary basis.  These micro and macro objectives were mutually 
compatible, and their achievement required a radical reform of the pension system.  The reform was 
becoming urgent also for demographic reasons.  These were the same as are found in many developed 
countries:  longer post-retirement life and lower birth rate. 
 The reform is limited to retirement (old age) pensions outside agriculture.  It involves the creation 
of a new institutional architecture and the introduction of new rules concerning contributions and benefits. 
 Five principles can be identified as having guided these changes.  Namely: 
 
(a) The diversification principle:  Security and efficiency of the pension system must be  
 enhanced, and to do this is by diversifying the system between state and private funds  
 and between obligatory and voluntary contributions.  Moreover, the savings measures  
 introduced in the obligatory part of the system must be sufficiently strong to pay for 
 much of the cost of the reform. 
(b) The distribution principle:  The public part of the new system should continue to be 
 of the PAYG type, while being made less redistributive and more transparent. 
(c) The capital-funding principle:  The private part of the system should be capital funded 
 and well-regulated. 
(d) The savings principle:  The expenditure-savings measures introduced in the obligatory 
 part of the system must be sufficiently strong to pay for any cost of reform, and 
(e) The gradual phasing-in principle:  The phasing-in of the new system must be spread  
 over a prolonged period of time, and should not involve people near retirement.   
 
We shall briefly discuss these principles in turn. 
 
Principle a. The system of retirement pensions for workers consists of three pillars:  (I) state, (II) 
open pension funds and (III) other pension funds.  Only pillars II and III are private, and only pillars I and 
II will receive obligatory contributions. 
 
Principle b. Obligatory contributions are to remain proportional to earnings, a form of payroll tax, but 
will now be subject to a cut-off point equal to 2.5 times the average wage.  To make the tax more 
transparent, half of the contribution paid before the reform by employers is added to wages and paid by 
employees.  The key innovation, however, has been the establishment of personal accounts to which all 
the obligatory contributions of those in the new system would be assigned.  These personal contributions, 
if not used as pensions, can be inherited by survivors. 
 
Principle c. The private pension funds which constitute pillar II receive a specified part of all the 
obligatory contributions.  However, a key question which reformers had to address was:  How does one 
protect future pensioners from inefficient pension funds?  In Poland, a two fold solution was adopted.  
Firstly, contributors are free to move their savings between funds.  Secondly, it is laid down that any 
recognised fund must, as a condition of remaining in business, guarantee to all its contributors a rate of 
return not less than 2 percentage points below the pension industry’s average rate.  This solution is likely 
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to force less efficient funds out of business.  To prevent a collapse of the industry into a monopoly, it will 
be necessary to issue from time to time new licenses to new funds. 
 
Principle d. The part of the obligatory contributions which is diverted to pillar II represents a loss of 
revenue to pillar I.  Thus, the reform implies a deterioration of public finances in the initial phase of its 
implementation.  To contain this deterioration, supplementary reforms are needed in pillar I.  The most 
important of these are tighter criteria for entitlement to invalidity pensions, increasing the effective 
retirement age in (Poland, from 56 in 1997 to 60 for women and 65 for men;  Hungary progressively 
raised and unified to 62 by 2001 (men) and 2009 (women)), by reducing the scope for early retirement, 
and reducing the rate of growth of real pensions, in Poland to a minimum of 0.15 in the years 1999-2000 
and 0.20 from 2001 of the growth rate of real wages.   In Hungary the indexation rule was changed from 
net wages to a weighted average of gross nominal wages and prices; starting in 2001, the weights are to 
be 0.5 and 0.5, the so-called Swiss formula.  Further expenditure-saving reforms are needed to replace 
the subsidy component, in Poland about 95% of total spending, of the pension system for farmers. 
 
Principle e. A gradual phasing-in of the reform is intended, to protect the rights of older workers.  
Hence the provision of the Polish reform that all people aged 50 and above remain in the old system, 
while those between 30 and 50 years old will have the right of choice, and only those aged 30 and below 
are all compelled to join the new system.  This arrangement has two advantages:  it reduces sharply the 
political resistance to reform and it helps to contain the financial costs of its implementation.  The 
Hungarian arrangement is even more flexible, as the new system is mandatory only for new entrants to the 
labour force, while all the existing workers have the right either to opt in or remain in the old system. 
 
 
7. Reform Developments and Pension Projections 
 
In this section I shall first briefly review and then compare the pension reforms which have been 
implemented or approved for implementation.  The purpose of this comparative review is to seek the 
reasons for any differences in the reform programmes.  
 In general, three approaches to the reform of a PAYG-DP pension system are possible:  (i) 
reformers within the system, (ii) complete shift to a fully-funded system, and (iii) an intermediate 
arrangement in the form of a multi-pillar (typically three pillars) system the Czech Republic adopted 
strategy (i), Hungary and Poland strategy (iii), and Romania is about to adopt strategy (iii). 
 
The Czech Republic 
 
The Czech authorities have prepared long-term scenarios of the financial position of the public pension 
system for 1997-2020, taking into account demographic developments.  The key finding was that “if the 
current replacement rate is maintained and the retirement age increases in accordance with the pension 
law, the premium tariff would need to increase from the current 26% to 36% in 2020”, (IMF, 1998, 
p.43). 
Pensions are not subject to any tax in the Czech Republic, and this distorts comparisons with 
other countries.  If taxes were applied, pension expenditures would be some 1.5% of GDP higher than 
officially reported.  Compared to Poland, the Czech Republic has two disadvantages.  One is that the 
unemployment rate, which was very low during most of the 1990s, started to increase sharply under the 
weight of the 1997-1999 recession and is likely to continue increasing in response to subsequent 
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restructuring.  The other disadvantage is the absence of any significant pool of labour in agriculture that 
would swell the number of contributors to the pension system in the future. 
Nevertheless, the Czech authorities decided against a wholesale pension reform, even of the 
intermediate and gradual three-pillar type proposed by the World Bank and adopted by Hungary and 
Poland.  Such a wholesale reform would make explicit a substantial part of the implicit pension debt 
accumulated under the present system.  According to Schneider (1999), “This debt is often cited as the 
insurmountable barrier for any (substantial) reform proposal”.  The Czech response to the threat of a 
substantial increase of the premium tariff has been to adopt changes to the present PAYG-DB system 
and to implement them gradually.  These changes involve above all a gradual increase in the retirement 
age, linking benefits more directly to contributions, and adopting a price indexation formula for pensions 
which is intended to lower the ratio of pensions to wages. 
 
Hungary and Poland 
 
In the post-WWII period, demographic trends in Hungary were similar to those in the Czech Republic.  
However, during the 1990s, restructuring went far deeper in Hungary, leading to a much sharper increase 
in the ratio of pensioners to contributors (Table 1).  The replacement rate declined in both countries, but 
the decline was sharp in the Czech Republic and quite moderate in Hungary.  In Poland this rate 
increased sharply during the 1990s.  It would thus appear that the countries that undertook more 
significant restructuring, such as Hungary and Poland, were also under greater social pressure, to which 
they succumbed, to keep the replacement ratio high.  In these countries the pension system became an 
extension of the social protection safetynet to ease opposition to restructuring reforms.  The 
macroeconomic implications of this combination of deeper restructuring and larger pension transfers were 
larger budget deficits and higher payroll taxes in Hungary and Poland than in the Czech Republic.  The 
further implication was that the financial pressure to reform the pension system was also greater in 
Hungary and Poland.  The threat of a major macroeconomic instability forced Hungary to adopt a tough 
stabilization programme in 1995.  In 1996, a government led by social democrats initiated liberal reforms 
of the pension system.  The relevant legislation was adopted in July 1997 and, in January 1998, Hungary 
became the first transition country to begin implementing a 3-pillar pension system.  The motivations, aims 
and specific principles of the Hungarian reform (Palacios and Rocha, 1997) are the same as, or similar to, 
those which Poland adopted one year later (Gomulka and Styczen, 1999).  A broad description of these 
principles was given in Section 6 above.  In both countries, the reform applies only to retirement 
pensions.  However, in Hungary these pensions accounted, in late 1990s, for some 80% of all pensions 
expenditures, as against 55% in Poland.  The latter proportion indicates that much of the pension problem 
in Poland still remains to be solved.  As indicated earlier, Poland remains the world leader in pensions 
other than old age (mainly invalidity and family pensions) which are internationally exceptionally high in 
terms both of  their number in relation to the labour force and levels in relation to wages.  Moreover, 
there remains the problem of what to do with the financing of pensions for the agricultural community. 
 
Romania 
 
As noted earlier - so far, during transition, pension expenditures in Romania have been kept low in 
relation to GDP.  However, simulations indicate that the contribution rate must increase from 25.5% in 
1996 (and 32.5% in 1999) to 41.5% in 2040 in order to maintain the 1998 ratio of pensions to wages 
(De Menil et al, 1999).  In 1998, this ratio, at 36.2%, was much lower than in Hungary and Poland 
(Table 1).  Romania is therefore expected to experience social pressure to increase that ratio in the future. 
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 This pressure and the expected increase of the coverage of the population by pension insurance are two 
major factors which prompted the Romanian government, in 1999, to propose a reform of the state 
pension system along the Hungarian-Polish model (G. De Menil, et al, 1999). 
 
 
8. Conclusions 
 
Demographic trends during the years 2000-2050 (for which projections are typically made), are 
expected to be similar in the FOUR to the major EU countries.  Populations will be either stable (Poland, 
Romania, France, UK) or declining (Hungary, the Czech Republic, Germany, Italy).  Dependency ratios 
(65+ to 15-64 year olds) are projected to increase in most countries, including our FOUR, at a 
historically unusual pace.  These ratios in the four EU countries listed above are expected to increase 
from about 24% in 2000 to about 40-45% in France and Italy and 50-60% in Germany and Italy (Chand 
and Jaeger, 1996).  In Poland this ratio is projected to increase from 17.7% in 2000 to 40.9% in 2050 
(Styczen, 1999), and in Hungary from about 25% in 2000 to about 40% in 2050 (Palacios and Rocha, 
1997).  The elderly population itself is projected to age considerably in most countries.  This is indicated 
by the ‘very elderly’ ratio (75+ to 65+), which is expected to increase, in the four EU countries, from 
about 40-45% in 2000 to about 60% in 2050.  This ratio in Poland is projected to increase from about 
40% in 2000 to about 51% in 2035 and then to decline to 42% in 2050 (Styczen, 1999). 
Pension systems and pension expenditures show large variations among countries worldwide.  
This variation appears to reflect mainly demographic factors and differences in the level of insurance 
protection, the latter tending to increase with the level of development.  The focus of this paper are 
pension developments and reforms in the FOUR transition countries:  the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland and Romania, during the 1990s.  Poland and Romania are found to be clear outliers among the 
FOUR in terms of key pensions statistics.  The study suggests that the greater pension expenditures in 
Hungary and Poland are in part inherited (especially in Poland) and in part caused by the more radical 
restructuring reforms, and that these greater expenditures have in turn prompted these two countries to 
start replacing gradually their PAYG-DB system with a three-pillar mixed system, with private pension 
funds constituting a large component of the reformed system. 
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